This paper presents a comparison of total factor productivity (TFP) levels between the US and Japan for the period 1960-2004 and allocates the gap to individual industries. We carefully distinguish the various concepts of purchasing power parity (PPP) and measure them within the framework of a US -Japan bilateral input -output table. We also measure industry-level PPPs for capital, labor, energy, and materials inputs and output for 42 industries common to the US and Japan, based on detailed estimates for 164 commodities, 33 assets, including land and inventories, and 1596 labor categories. The US -Japan productivity gap shrank during three decades of rapid Japanese economic growth, . The Japanese manufacturing sector achieved parity with its US counterpart by the end of the period. With the collapse of the Japanese economic bubble at the end of the 1980s, the US -Japan productivity gap reversed course and expanded to 79.5% by 2004. This can be attributed to rapid productivity growth in the IT-producing industries in the US during the late 1990s and the sharp acceleration of productivity growth in the IT-using industries in the US during 2000 -2004. Wholesale and Retail Trade emerged as the largest contributor to this gap, accounting for 25.1% of the lower TFP of the Japanese economy.
Introduction
The growth of the Japanese economy from 1960 to 1990 far outstripped that of other industrialized economies and inspired the admiration of the world! Japanese GDP grew at 10% per year during 1960-1973, nearly quadrupling the size of the Japanese economy. Starting from only 25.5% of US GDP per capita in 1960, the Japanese economy made a major leap to 56.7% of the US level in 1973. Rapid growth of the Japanese GDP at 4.5% per year through 1990 nearly doubled the size of the Japanese economy again, bringing Japanese GDP per capita to 78.3% of the US.
Measuring Purchasing Power Parities
We estimate the purchasing power parities (PPPs) for capital, labor, energy, and materials (KLEM) inputs by industry. In the next subsection we introduce the common US-Japan industry classification used in this paper. We introduce our measurement of the detailed PPPs for 164 commodities, based on a variety of concepts and a multitude of data sources, and describe the industry-level PPP for output and intermediate inputs for energy and materials. The industry-level PPPs for capital and labor inputs are also presented.
Common Industry Classification
Our data for productivity in Japan are based on Jorgenson and Nomura (2005) . These data draw on the Keio Economic Observatory (KEO) database maintained at Keio University in Tokyo. We employ the US data presented by Jorgenson et al. (2007) . These extend the database described in detail by . The two databases have a closely comparable structure and employ similar national accounting concepts. The cost of capital is used in measuring capital inputs and imputing the value for non-market production of capital services by household and government sectors.
Our first step is to establish a common classification for US and Japanese industries. In our previous US -Japan comparisons (Jorgenson et al., 1987; Jorgenson and Kuroda, 1990; Kuroda and Nomura, 1999; Nomura, 2004, Chapter 4) we have employed a common industry classification with about 30 industries. For this study we have developed a new 42-industry classification that enables us to identify the IT-producing sectors -Computers, Communications Equipment, and Electronic Components. 2 We quantify the impact of IT production, as well as investment in IT equipment and software, in both the US and Japan. Common classifications for capital and labor inputs are described below.
The public sector is a special challenge in creating a common industry classification. This sector should be separated from private business, although it is difficult to maintain this distinction in practice. In both the US and Japan public sector activities are included in private industries with similar technological characteristics. For example, government-run power authorities are classified as Electric Utilities in both economies. We set the productivity gap between the US and Japan equal to zero for the non-market production of capital services by households and the public sector.
Purchasing Power Parities for Output and Intermediate Inputs

Elementary level purchasing power parities
There are two approaches to defining PPPs. Using production-side data for domestically produced goods, the PPPs in producer's prices are ratios of average unit prices, each defined as the monetary value over the physical quantity. This approach is especially easy to implement in sectors with outputs defined in physical units, for example, Electricity. On the other hand, PPPs can be estimated from demand-side data by eliminating the wedge between producer's prices and purchaser's prices due to trade and transportation margins and taxes, taking import prices into account.
We employ a hybrid approach developed by Masahiro Kuroda, Kazushige Shimpo, and ourselves. In this paper, we have revised the elementary-level estimates of Nomura and Miyagawa (1999) . They provide PPPs for 164 commodity groups, estimated from both production-side and demand-side price data within the framework of a US -Japan bilateral input -output table. 3 Since a number of the key papers describing the hybrid approach have been published only in Japanese, we first outline the methodology and then discuss the data sources for our PPPs.
Our measurement of elementary level PPPs is based on the 1990 US -Japan Bilateral Input -Output (I-O) Table, published by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 1997. We postulate a price model describing the relationships among producer's prices and purchaser's prices for domestically produced and imported goods. The US -Japan trade structure in the 1990 Bilateral I-O Table maintains consistent price differences between the two economies, considering differences in freight and insurance rates, duty tax rates, wholesale and retail trade margins, transportation costs (railway, road, water, air, and others), and import shares of each commodity in the US and Japan. 4 Using demand-side data for purchaser's price PPPs for final demands, we estimate the producer's price PPPs for domestically produced goods, based on our price model and related parameters. In addition, using production-side data for PPPs in producer's prices, we estimate PPPs for composites of domestically produced and imported goods by inverting the price model.
One of the difficulties in estimating PPPs in producer's prices from demand-side data is to define PPPs for imported goods. These are required to separate PPPs for domestically produced commodities from composite PPPs for commodity groups that include imports. 5 Using the US -Japan bilateral I-O Table, goods purchased in Japan can be separated into domestically produced goods, goods imported from the US, and goods imported from the Rest of the World (ROW). The purchaser's prices in Japan for goods imported from the US can be linked to prices of domestically produced goods in the US, taking into consideration the costs of freight and insurance required for shipment from the US to Japan and duties levied by Japanese customs. Similarly, import prices in the US can be linked to domestic output prices in Japan.
The most comprehensive demand-side data are the Eurostat-OECD Purchasing Power Parities. Price differences are defined as the gaps between purchaser's prices, including wholesale and retail margins for final demands. These prices reflect not only the prices of domestically produced goods but also imported goods. We assume that prices of imports into Japan from the US are sums of producer's prices in the US, freight and insurance costs, customs duties, margins for wholesale and retail trade, and transportation costs. We also assume that the import prices from the ROW are same as the composite prices of domestic goods and goods imported from the US. Given these assumptions, we determine the two relative prices for domestically produced goods and composite goods simultaneously within the framework of the US -Japan bilateral I-O table.
Another difficulty in estimation of PPPs from demand-side data is the absence of price comparisons for goods not purchased as final demands. For example, the price for an intermediate good like semiconductors plays a significant role in our US-Japan productivity comparisons. In order to supply the missing information, METI has carried out a survey on disparities between domestic and foreign prices of industrial intermediate inputs. By contrast with the Eurostat-OECD PPPs, this survey targets only intermediate goods. Price differences are defined as purchaser's prices, including the difference in wholesale and (sometimes) retail margins for intermediate goods in each economy. Using these data, the PPPs for domestically produced goods can be estimated on the basis of our price model. There are relatively rich data sources for US -Japan price comparisons. In addition to the two large-scale investigations by Eurostat-OECD and METI, a number of surveys have been implemented by Japanese ministries and agencies in the 1990s. This reflects the increasing policy interest in US -Japan price differences, resulting from strengthening the Japanese yen, relative to the US dollar, after the Plaza Accord of 1985. We have used PPP data for consumer goods (METI, Cabinet Office), transportation and related services (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, MLIT), residential buildings and infrastructure (MLIT), medicine and medical equipment (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, MHLW), barber services, beauty treatments, cleaning, and movies (MHLW), living expenses (Cabinet Office), food and restaurants (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, MAFF), wood products (Forestry Agency), cellular phones and car phones (Ministry for Internal Affairs and Communications, MIC), whiskey (National Tax Agency). These data are estimated for different years and different stages of demand. We have reconciled these data within a bilateral I-O framework, taking into account the differences in timing of the surveys.
For computer hardware and software we have used new data from the IDC survey implemented during 1999-2002. 6 In addition, we have investigated US -Japan price differences for matched models of representative prepackaged software and personal computers that can be purchased on the internet. 7 Based on sample prices for computer hardware and software, the Japanese price is almost the same as the US price; however, the Japanese price is somewhat higher than the US price for servers. We have converted these prices to base-year PPPs for 1990, using the price indexes for each component from our databases for the US and Japan, described in Jorgenson and Nomura (2005) .
Industry-level purchasing power parities
After determining the elementary level PPPs, we have estimated five PPPs for each of 164 commodities: (1) a producer's price PPP for domestically produced goods, excluding net indirect taxes, (2) a producer's price PPP for composite goods sold to households, (3) a producer's price PPP for composite goods sold to industry, (4) a purchaser's price PPP for composite goods sold to households, and (5) a purchaser's price PPP for composite goods sold to industry. 8 For the purpose of bilateral comparisons of productivity, the PPP estimates (1), (3), and (5) are used as the elementary-level PPPs for output, intermediate inputs, and the acquisition of investment goods, respectively.
We aggregate the 164 elementary level PPPs into the 42-industry PPPs for output, using the translog index in equation (15) of the Methodological Appendix. The weights are the average shares of each industry's output in the two economies in the 1990 US -Japan Bilateral I-O Table. Similarly, industry-level PPPs for intermediate inputs are translog indexes, using the average shares as weights. 9 The relative prices for non-market production in the government and household sectors are set equal to unity in order to make the US -Japan productivity gap equal to zero in these sectors.
Purchasing Power Parities for Capital Inputs
Purchasing power parities for investment
In the Methodological Appendix, we define elementary-level prices for capital inputs. The unit price of capital input of asset i in economy c is defined in equation (5), Q ij K,c is defined in equations (4) and (5) in the Appendix. We summarize the formulation for the price of The Industry Origins of the US -Japan Productivity Gap 319 capital input as:P
where P ijt A,c represents the unit cost for acquisition of one dollar's worth of assets. The coefficient f ijt c is an annualization factor that transforms the cost of acquisition into the price of capital services. Defining the PPP for the cost of acquisition as described in 2.2.2, the PPP for capital input is defined as:
The key to measuring the PPP for capital input is the relative value of annualization factor and the PPP for the acquisition of assets. Our first step in measuring PPPs for capital inputs is to construct a common asset classification for the US and Japan. We define a 33-asset classification, consisting of 29 tangible assets, two intangible assets (mineral exploration and software), inventories, and land. To measure PPPs for the acquisition of each asset, we construct translog indexes of the purchaser's price PPPs for the composite goods by industry. These indexes are based on our estimates for elementary level PPPs for the 164 commodities described above. The PPPs for acquisition of inventories are assumed to be the average of PPPs for acquisition of tangible assets, except for buildings and construction. The difference in land prices between the US and Japan has a substantial impact on the PPPs for capital inputs, as pointed out by Nomura (2004, Chapter 3) . He indicates that Japan's acquisition price of land for commercial and industrial uses was 9.1 times higher than that in the US in 1990. The price for capital acquisition in Japan is 2.9 times higher than that in the US in 1990 if we include land in capital input, but only 24% higher in Japan if land is excluded. We employ the higher estimates, including the PPP for land. It has been neglected in our previous measurement of TFP gap between the US and Japan, although the capital input of land has been counted in TFP measures in both countries.
Purchasing power parities for capital input
The final step in measuring PPPs for capital inputs is to determine the relative value of the annualization factors between the US and Japan for each asset and each industry. A novel feature of our data sets for the US and Japan is that the annualization factors are measured on the basis of comparable formulations of the price of capital input, assuming assetspecific revaluations for all assets and endogenous rates of return for each industry. Tax considerations are a key component of the prices of capital inputs. 10 The measurement of capital services is described by Jorgenson et al. (2005, Chapter 5 ) for the US and Nomura (2004, Chapter 3) and Jorgenson and Nomura (2005) for Japan. The annualization factors are estimated for 59 assets in 36 industries in the US and 103 assets in 47 industries in Japan. The estimates are aggregated into measures for the 33-asset US -Japan common asset classification in each industry. Including land as a capital input, the aggregate PPP for acquisition of capital goods is 2.9 in 1990, but the aggregate PPP for capital input is only 1.6, reflecting lower annualization factors in Japan.
Purchasing Power Parities for Labor Inputs
We assume that hours worked can be used to approximate one dollar's worth of labor input for each category of labor at the elementary level. Thus, L ijt c and L ijt c in equation (4) in the Methodological Appendix represent labor input and hours worked, respectively. In addition, P ijt L,c and P ijt L,c in equation (5) are the price indexes for labor input and average hourly labor compensation, respectively. Labor quality Q ij L,c is given by base-year average hourly labor compensation.
To define PPPs for labor inputs, we follow Nomura and Samuels (2003) , revising the estimates to conform to our common US -Japan industry classification. 11 For both US and Japanese data sets the labor inputs are cross-classified by sex, age, education, class of worker, and industry. The US -Japan common labor classification system allows us to compare wages of similar workers. After classifying the workers by sex, we split the workers by the other categories -industry, age, class of worker, and education. The US data set has eight age classifications for workers and Japan has eleven. We choose a common classification of six age groups -under 24 years old, 25-34, 35 -44, 45-54, 55 -64 , and over 65 years of age.
In both economies workers are classified as employed or self-employed and unpaid family workers. However, labor compensation for the self-employed and unpaid family workers is estimated differently in the US and Japan. In the US data, the hourly wage of self-employed and unpaid family workers is set equal to the hourly wage of the employed. Hours worked times this wage yields an estimate of labor compensation for self-employed and unpaid family workers. In the Japanese data, wage rates of selfemployed workers are available for selected industries that yield an estimate of labor compensation for the self-employed group. The wage differential between self-employed and unpaid family workers is estimated from the differential between full-time and part-time employees. Because of these differences, we consider only employed workers when measuring the PPPs for labor input.
In the Japanese data there are different levels of detail for the educational attainment of male and female workers. Male workers are divided among four educational groups, while female workers are split into three. In the common data set we use the most detailed classification available in the Japanese data. After cross-classifying the data by all the demographic characteristics, we have 1596 groups in total, 912 groups of male employees and 684 groups of female employees. We calculate the industry-level PPP for labor inputs as the translog index of the elementary-level PPPs.
Empirical Results
Purchasing Power Parities
We summarize our estimates of PPPs in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and capital, labor, and intermediate inputs. For each industry the PPP for value added is defined by the double deflation method, using industry-level PPPs for gross output and intermediate inputs. We define the PPP for GDP as a translog index of the industrylevel PPPs for value added, taking the weight changes over periods into account. Similarly, the PPPs for the capital, labor, energy, and materials (KLEM) inputs are defined as translog indexes of industry-level PPPs for these inputs.
The Industry Origins of the US -Japan Productivity Gap 321 Table 1 presents our estimates of PPPs for Japan. For 2004 our estimate for GDP is 133.9 yen/dollar; this implies that a unit of GDP costing one dollar in the US was valued at 133.9 yen in Japan. Since one US dollar exchanged for 108.2 yen, Japan's price for GDP was 23.8% higher than the US price. Our PPP estimates are based on outputs, while the Eurostat -OECD PPPs presented in Table 1 are based on expenditures (OECD, 2006) . According to the Eurostat -OECD estimate, the Japanese price of GDP in 2004 was 23.6% higher than the US price. Although the two PPP estimates are nearly identical in 2004, our output-based estimates are higher than the expenditure-based estimates for 1960 and 1973 and lower for the period 1985-2000. Figure 1 represents the long-term trends of PPPs for GDP and the KLEM inputs. The yen -dollar exchange rate is drawn as a shadow figure. If the PPP is higher than the shadow figure, the Japanese price is higher than the US price. Until the mid-1970s, the Japanese price for GDP was lower than the US price and Japanese input prices were lower than the US prices, except for energy. Lower input prices provided a source of international price competitiveness for Japanese products in the 1960s and 1970s.
The Plaza Accord of 1985 was a crucial turning point for the Japanese economy. In 1985 the yen was undervalued by about 17%, based on a comparison between our output-based PPP for GDP and the yen -dollar exchange rate. In the late 1980s the rapid strengthening of the yen relative to the US dollar reversed this relationship, leading to an overvaluation of the yen by 25% in 1990. The revaluation of the yen continued through 1995, leading to an overvaluation of 78%! This was followed by a gradual devaluation through 2004, leaving the yen overvalued by 24%, very close to the 1990 level.
The Japanese economy spent more than a decade overcoming the huge overvaluation of the yen that followed the Plaza Accord. This was accomplished mainly by domestic deflation, rather than devaluation of the yen. The price of GDP in Japan, relative to the US, declined by 4% annually through 2004 from the peak attained in 1994. The decline in the PPP for GDP at 2.5% per year was the result of modest inflation in the US of 1.4% and deflation in Japan of 1.1%. In addition, the yen-dollar exchange rate fell by 1.5% per year. Figure 2 presents industry-level relative prices for value added and industry origins of the gap in the PPP of 181.0 yen per dollar of the output-based GDP in 1990. The Japanese price for value added was lower than the US price in 16 industries, while the Japanese price for gross output was lower in only ten industries. Even if the relative price for gross output is greater than unity, the relative price for value added can be less than unity as a consequence of high prices of energy and materials inputs in Japan. The Household sector produces services of owner-occupied dwellings and consumer durables and made the greatest contribution to the PPP for GDP in 1990. This reflects high prices of buildings and land in Japan and the large share of value added by the Household sector. Electricity, which is very expensive in Japan, pushed up the Japanese PPP by 2.2%.
Economic Growth in the US and Japan
Table 2 summarizes our empirical results on economic growth and its sources for the US and Japanese economies. Despite the long economic recession in Japan, beginning in the early 1990s, rapid technological progress in the IT-producing industries diffused quickly through investment in information technology (IT) equipment and software by the ITusing industries. Jorgenson and Nomura (2005) 12 have discussed these findings through 2000 in greater detail. Table 2 shows that the trends they identified have continued through 2004. Japanese economic growth slowed further after 2000, but the contribution of IT-capital input continued to rise.
The annual rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in Japan improved from 0.48% per year in 1995-2000 to 0.57% during 2000-2004. The contribution of labor input was after 2000 was the substantial increase in the contribution of TFP growth and the shift in its industry origins. The annual growth rate of TFP during 2000 -2004 was 1.27% per year, close to twice the growth rate of the late 1990s and 2.7 times the long-term average growth rate during 1960-2000 of 0.46%.
Perhaps surprisingly, the substantial improvement in US TFP growth between 1995-2000 and 2000 -2004 was achieved by a wide variety of IT-using industries rather than the IT-producing sectors as discussed more in detail in Jorgenson et al. (2007) . The TFP contribution by the IT-manufacturing sector was only 0.04%, a precipitous drop from 0.48% during 1995 -2000. By contrast, the TFP contributions in communications, trade, and finance and insurance improved by 0.11, 0.36, and 0.19% points, respectively. In addition, the negative contribution of 20.30% per year in other services during the late 1990s gave way to a positive 0.15% after 2000. Figures 3 and 4 compare industry-level TFP growth and contributions to economic growth between the periods 1995 -2000 and 2000-2004. In the key IT-producing sectors, Electronic Components and Computers, TFP growth in the US slowed by more The Industry Origins of the US -Japan Productivity Gap 325 than ten percentage points. The improvement of TFP growth in the IT-using sectors seems modest by comparison with improvements of 1.9 percentage points in Communications, 1.7 in Wholesale and Retail Trade, 1.6 points in Other Services, and 1.2 points in Finance and Insurance. However, as shown in Figure 4 , these industries made substantially 
Level Comparisons of Output, Input, and Productivity
Panel A in Table 3 summarizes the productivity gap between the US and Japan. This table compares relative levels of output, output per capita, input per capita, and total factor productivity between the two economies over the period 1960 -2004 . Differences in output per capita can be decomposed into differences in input per capita and TFP, the ratio of output to input. For example, Japanese GDP was 30.2% of the US level in 2004. GDP per capita in Japan was 69.5% of US GDP per capita, while Japanese input per capita was 87.6% and Japanese TFP was 79.5% of the corresponding US levels. In Panel B we compare levels of per capita capital and labor inputs in Japan and the US. These are the two sources of differences in input per capita in Table 3 . Japanese labor input per capita in 1960 was only slightly below the US level and Japan has led in labor input per capita since 1973. Japan maintained a lead in hours worked per capita throughout the period 1960 -2004, despite a gradual decline after 1973 that accelerated sharply during the 1990s. The US -Japan gap in labor quality, defined as labor input per hour worked, was 78.1% in 1960. This gap gradually closed during the three decades of rapid Japanese growth, ending in 1990. Japan overtook the US in labor quality in 1995 and has maintained its lead through the past decade. This reflects the attainment of high average levels of education in Japan, as well as gains in the experience of the Japanese labor force.
Japanese capital input, relative to the US, presents a striking contrast to labor input. In 1960, Japanese capital input per capita was only 23.2% of the US level, but staggering levels of investment in Japan during the double-digit growth of 1960 -1973 reduced the gap to 50.0% by 1973. The gap continued to close through 1995, when Japanese capital input per capita reached 74.0% of the US level. The investment slump that followed the collapse of the bubble economy in Japan at the end of the 1980s and the US investment boom of the late 1990s widened the gap to 68.5% in 2000 and 66.2% in 2004. We conclude that deficient investment in Japan, especially after 1995, accounts for the remaining gap in input per capita.
Panel B provides a decomposition of the US -Japan gap in capital input per capita between capital stock per capita and capital quality. Capital quality is defined as capital input per unit of capital stock and reflects the composition of the capital stock. In 1960, Japanese capital quality, relative to the US was 61.2%, but this rose to 95.4% by 1973 and the gap had essentially closed by 1980. Capital quality in Japan attained 104.0% of the US level in 1995, before the IT investment boom in the US, but declined to 95.5% of the US level in 2000 and 93.8% in 2004. After 1973 the US -Japan gap in capital stock per capita largely paralleled the gap in capital input per capita.
Panel C compares the levels of capital deepening of IT-and Non-IT capital in the US and Japan, where capital deepening is defined as an increase in capital input per hour worked. Capital deepening is an important source of growth in labor productivity. Capital input per hour worked in Japan rose from 19.3% of the US level in 1960 to 67.1% in 2000 before falling back to 62.6% in 2004 as hours worked declined in the US. IT-capital deepening in Japan peaked at 90.2% of the US level in 1990 before declining to 87.3% in 1995 and falling precipitously to 56.6% in 2004. The trend in Non-ITcapital deepening was similar to overall capital deepening. 13 Panel D gives level comparisons of labor productivity and capital productivity, defined as output per hour worked and output per unit of capital stock, respectively. Labor productivity in Japan was only 21.2% of the US level in 1960. The labor productivity gap shrank rapidly until 1995, when Japanese labor productivity reached almost 70% of the US level. In sharp contrast, Japanese capital productivity exceeded the US level throughout the period 1960 -2004, peaking at 119.9% in 1990. The trends in relative labor and capital productivity reflect relative factor supplies in the two economies. Japan has had a substantially higher labor/capital ratio than the US throughout the period. The high labor/capital ratio is consistent with the low capital/labor PPPs presented in Table 1 .
The sources of US -Japan labor productivity gap are shown in Figure 5 . The y-axis gives the logarithm of the relative productivity level. In 1960, lower Non-IT-capital deepening in Japan explained 50.1% of the US -Japan labor productivity gap, while lower Japanese
The Industry Origins of the US -Japan Productivity Gap 329 TFP explained 40.4%. The lower quality of labor input and lower IT-capital deepening contributed 8.8% and 0.7%, respectively. As a consequence of rapid capital deepening in Japan, the TFP gap has been the major source of lower labor productivity since the mid-1990s. Lower TFP explains 57.0% of the labor productivity gap in 2004, while Non-IT-capital deepening accounts for 37.3%.
Industry Origins of the US -Japan Productivity Gap
Figure 6 presents long-term trends of TFP gaps in manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. In 1960, both gaps were very large. However, the TFP gap for manufacturing had almost disappeared by 1990, 14 so that the overall gap reflected lower TFP in non-manufacturing. The expansion of the TFP gap after 1990 was due mainly to deterioration in the relative TFP level in Japanese manufacturing.
Finally, we focus on the industry origins of the US -Japan TFP gap. Figures 7 and 8 present industry-level TFP gaps and the contributions of each industry to the overall TFP gap for 1990 and 2004, respectively. Industries are ordered by the magnitude of their contributions to the TFP gap in each year. The first column in each figure gives the US -Japan TFP gap, defined as the ratio of TFP in Japan to TFP in the US. Note that TFP gaps for Public Administration and Household sectors are zero by definition, since the outputs of these industries consist entirely of capital inputs. The second column gives the contribution of each industry to the aggregate TFP gap, using Domar weights from equation (24) in the Methodological Appendix.
In 1990, the US -Japan productivity gap reached a minimum for the period 1960-2004. Japanese TFP exceeded that in the US for 17 of 40 industries, led by Motor Vehicles. Substantial positive contributions to Japanese TFP, relative to the US, were also made by Machinery, Finance and Insurance, and Electronic Components. Other Services accounted Figure 9 depicts the long-term trends in TFP levels in the US and Japan for 12 particularly important industries. Productivity levels in each industry are normalized by the US productivity level in 1960. In 1960, the TFP level in Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery was only slightly inferior to the US, but the TFP gap widened after 1973, reflecting large differences in the scale of individual production units, as well as massive public investments in new agricultural technology in the US. Construction showed declining productivity trends in both economies with the US -Japan TFP gap gradually closing.
We next consider three IT-producing sectors -Computers, Communications Equipment, and Electronic Components. The Japanese computer industry led its US counterpart until the early 1990s, when US TFP growth accelerated sharply. This was followed five years later by a similar acceleration in Japanese TFP growth. The deceleration of TFP growth in the US industry after 2000 has reduced, but not eliminated, the US -Japan gap. The Japanese telecommunications equipment industry achieved parity with the US industry in the late 1970s but underwent a substantial acceleration in the mid-1990s and emerged with a sizable lead by 2004. The US electronic components industry lagged behind the Japanese industry until the mid-1990s, but gained a substantial lead in the late 1990s that has shrunk but not entirely disappeared since the dot-com crash of 2000. Figure 6 . TFP Gap in manufacturing and non-manufacturing during The Industry Origins of the US -Japan Productivity Gap 331
The US started with an early lead in Other Electrical Machinery but the Japanese industry achieved parity by 1973. Relative productivity levels have been very similar over the following three decades with Japan emerging with a slight lead in 2004. The Japanese Motor Vehicles industry has led its US counterpart since the early 1970s. However, the TFP gap has been fairly constant since the 1980s. The Japanese Communications industry The Industry Origins of the US -Japan Productivity Gap 333 TFP growth in Japan and an acceleration of TFP growth in the US. The US had a large productivity advantage over Japan in Finance and Insurance in 1960, but this shrank dramatically from 1960-1973 and then more gradually until the mid-1980s, when Japan emerged with an advantage for the first time. Both economies experienced a sharp acceleration in TFP growth in this industry, beginning in the late 1990s. Other Services has undergone a steady decline in TFP in both economies, but the US has maintained an edge.
Conclusion
A number of persistent differences between the US and Japanese economies have emerged from our international comparisons, including substantial gaps in total factor productivity, defined as output per unit of input. Allocating the US -Japan productivity gap to its origins at the level of individual industries is the first step in formulating policies to reduce or eliminate this gap. Both input per capita and total factor productivity are important sources of differences in output per capita between the US and Japan. Japan has led the US in hours worked per capita throughout the period 1960 -2004 and now leads in labor quality, defined as labor input per hour worked, as well.
Capital input presents a sharp contrast with labor input in US -Japan comparisons. Japan began with a very low level of capital input per capita, relative to the US in 1960, but made substantial progress in closing the gap through 1995. At that point, the Japanese economy was still suffering from the after-effects of the collapse of the bubble economy of the 1980s, while the US was beginning a massive investment boom in IT equipment and software. Japan has lost considerable ground in capital input per capita, relative to the US, after 1995, eventually reverting to the relative levels of the mid-1980s.
Japan has overcome the impact of the very substantial over-valuation of the yen that followed the Plaza Accord of 1985. However, this has required a decade of domestic deflation, accompanied by depressed investment levels and, especially, by insufficient investment in IT equipment and software. Japanese TFP growth has revived, but continues to lag behind the US. Japan has been very successful in exploiting new information technology in Communications equipment and Communications services. The impressive rebound of TFP growth in the Japanese Computer and Electronic components industries will continue to stimulate high levels of investment in information technology equipment and software by IT-using industries in Japan.
Finally, Japan succeeded in raising its relative level of TFP from 52.4% of the US level in 1960 to 86.1% in 1990. At that point, 17 of the 40 industries included in our US-Japan comparisons had higher levels of TFP in Japan and the Japanese manufacturing sector as a whole had achieved parity with its US counterpart. Japan's TFP growth stalled during the decade 1990-2000. US TFP increased rapidly during the period 1995-2000 and then accelerated sharply from 2000-2004, as Japan's TFP growth began to revive. By 2004, only 12 Japanese industries had higher TFP than their US counterparts. Wholesale and Retail Trade and Other Services, two industries largely sheltered from international competition, stand out as opportunities for substantial improvement in Japanese TFP, relative to the US.
Methodological Appendix
A1. Relative Price, Quantity, and Quality
A1.1. Elementary level
We start with the definition of value, price, and quantity for output and inputs of capital, labor, energy, and materials (K, L, E, M) at the elementary level. The nominal value V ijt u,c of industry j in country c, evaluated by own-currency unit in each country, is defined as follows:
where P ijt u,c is the price index (P ijT u,c ¼ 1.0 as of a base year T ) and X ijt u,c is the quantity index. The suffix i represents a subscript for the elementary components in each category (u ¼ Y, K, L, E, M). For example, in the case of labor input (u ¼ L), the subscript i stands for categories cross-classified by sex, age, education, and class of worker. Although the The Industry Origins of the US -Japan Productivity Gap 335 categories are different for each u, we use the same subscript for simplicity. 15 In comparing economies the industry classification j and elementary categories i are assumed to be identical, reflecting the common classifications we have established for the US and Japan.
The last term in equation (3) defines measures of price and quantity, P ijt u,c and X ijt u,c , which are based on the same units in each economy. To clarify this we define the elementary quality Q ij u,c from the quantities and prices as follows:
At the elementary level the quality Q ij u,c represents a base-year unit price with constant quality between the two economies, evaluated in terms of the currency units in each economy. This can be defined as the quantity purchased by one unit of the currency of the base economy in a base year. For example, let the US be the base economy and 'one-dollar's worth' be the quantity unit, equivalent to the base-year value of one dollar in the US. This provides the physical unit for each element of i applied to both economies. The cost of purchasing one-dollar's worth in each economy provides the unit price, P ijt u,c . Although the quantity, X ijt u,c , is not directly comparable between the two economies, the quality-adjusted quantity, X ijt u,c , provides a comparable quantity measure. In addition, P ijt u,c and Q ij u,c provide comparable measures of the quality-adjusted unit price and quality with taking the exchange rates between currencies into account. 16 For bilateral comparisons between the US (c ¼ U ) and Japan (c ¼ J ), we define the quality-adjusted quantity and price in Japan, using the US quality for each element i. Equations (3) -(5) in Japan are redefined as follows: 
where V ijt u,JjU ¼ V ijt u,J /e t and P ijt u,JjU ¼ P ijt u,J /e t , using the annual average exchange rate e t (Japanese yen per US dollar). Equation (7) represents the quality-adjusted quantity measure in Japan, X ijt u,JjU , which is directly comparable to the US quantity measure, X ijt u,U , applying US quality Q ij u,U . Equation (8) represents the quality-adjusted price measure in Japan, P ijt u,JjU , which is comparable to the US price index, P ijt u,U , adjusting for the US -Japan differences in quality and the exchange rate.
We define relative indexes for value, price, quantity, and quality between the US and Japan as:
